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Abstract 
Throughout the period between the first British settlement in Australia (1788) and the federation of the six 
evolving colonies into a single federal Commonwealth (1901), military forces on land were provided first 
by the British government (to 1870) and later by part-time or professional volunteers locally recruited. The 
federal constitution made defence the sole prerogative of the central government, and among that 
government's earliest pieces of legislation were Defence Acts (1903 and 1904). The existing colonial 
naval and military forces were integrated under single commands, and all Australian males between the 
ages of 18 and 60 (except conscientious objectors on religious grounds) were in time of war, made liable 
for service in the citizen military forces, within Australia or its territories. 
This journal article is available in Kunapipi: https://ro.uow.edu.au/kunapipi/vol18/iss2/8 
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Conscription for Military Service 
Throughout the period between the first British settlement in Australia 
(1788) and the federation of the six evolving colonies into a single 
federal Commonwealth (1901), military forces on land were provided 
first by the Bntish government (to 1870) and later by part-time or 
professional volunteers locally recruited. The federal constitution made 
defence the sole prerogative of the central government, and among that 
government's earliest pieces of legislation were Defence Acts (1903 and 
1904). The existing colonial naval and military forces were integrated 
under smgle commands, and all Australian males between the ages of 
18 and 60 (except conscientious objectors on religious grounds) were in 
time of war, made liable for service in the citizen military forces, within 
Australia or its territories. 
In view of subsequent events and the debates which the idea of 
compulsory military service wa::. to generate in both World Wars and 
the Vietnam war, the discussion in the early period was surprismgly 
uncontroversial. This was presumably because many Australians felt 
their country was vulnerable to foreign attack; they were aware of their 
remoteness from the protection of a great power, and their proximity to 
massive populations in Asia, whom they were determined to keep out 
of Australia. Furthermore, military conflict was in the public 
consciousness in all six colonies because of the war in South Africa 
(1899-1902) to which Australia contributed over 16,000 volunteers from 
a population of less than three million. The strongest supporters of 
compulsory training were on the political left, within the Australian 
Labor Party. 
International events in the first decade of federation, especially 
Japan's victory over Russia in 1904-05, and her tension with the United 
States two years later, reinforced these attitudes. Civilian 'National 
Defence Leagues' were formed in Britain, New Zealand, and Australia 
to encourage military service, and in 1909, Alfred Deakin' s ' Fusion' 
ministry amended the Defence Act to provide for compulsory part-time 
military training in peacetime: junior cadet traming (age 12-14), sen1or 
cadets (14-18), and citizen forces (18-20) with a reserve force of ages 20-
26. Some of the cadets were given naval training. The legislation was 
implemented two years later, with numerous exemptions (not 
including religious grounds) and many absentees had to be chased up 
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and, if apprehended, prosecuted. 
When war came in 1914, Australia raised a large force of volunteers-
the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) - to serve at Gallipoli and sub-
sequently in France and Belgium. Conscripts, on the other hand, could 
only serve in Australian territory. As the war dragged on and casualty 
rates mounted among the British and Imperial forces, the Australian 
Labor government and especially its Prime Minister, W. M. Hughes, 
came under pressure to introduce conscription for overseas service, to 
fill the ranks decimated on the Western Front. Within the Labor Party 
there was now considerable resistance to conscription especially, but by 
no means only, from those of Irish descent. The Catholic Archbishop of 
Melbourne, Daniel Mannix, lent his formidable weight to the anti-
conscription campaign. Hughes felt that the government had the legal 
right to introduce a compulsory scheme, but because of the split in his 
own party and in the country at large, he put the question, somewhat 
ambiguously, to a referendum where it was lost by a narrow but 
definite margin, winning neither an overall majority of votes nor the 
votes in a majority of states. 
As the war dragged on the attrition rate got worse, and in 1917 
Hughes, leading a new government formed from a rump of the Labor 
Party and the Liberal Opposition, again put the question of 
conscription - even more ambiguously - to a national referendum, 
where it was more decisively rejected . Many returned soldiers, valuing 
the comradeship of volunteers and believing they were more efficient 
and reliable, joined the opposition . 
Surprisingly, in the light of this rejection and the limited military 
value of compulsory service up to this time, it was retained after the 
war, though in a reduced form, and was only abolished in 1929, by the 
Scullin Labor government, on economic grounds. The gathering storm 
douds in Europe in the mid-to-late 1930s and Japan's imperial 
expansion into Manchuria and 'China proper', eventually caused an 
increase in the part-time militia force levels, but did not result in 
conscription, such was the social and political weight against it. Only in 
October 1939, after the outbreak of war with Germany, did the 
conservative United Australia Party Government reintroduce 
compulsory training and then only for service in Australia. The militia 
had only the same limited obligation and so the second Australian 
Imperial Force had to be specially enlisted, again, wholly from 
volunteers. It engendered a high spirit among them, but it created, in 
effect, two armies with intense feeling between them. 
It was only when the Japanese were hammering at Australia's gates 
in New Guinea, had bombed northern ports and shelled Sydney and 
Newcastle, that the Labor government led by John Curtin risked party 
disunity by extending the service liability of conscripts to islands of the 
South-West Pacific south of the equator. Conscripts thus fought 
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alongside volunteers in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, but it 
was never an easy relationship. Conscription ended when the war 
ended. 
Hitherto the full-time component of the Australian army had com-
prised staff and instructional corps, garrison artillery units, and depot 
personnel. The formations that fought both wars were basically 
civilians led by civilians, although by 1945 the majority of Australian 
generals were professional soldiers. Units specially formed and 
recruited comprised the Australian army component of the British 
Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. These units then became 
the basis of the combat element of the Australian Regular Army, which 
were subsequently used as part of the British Commonwealth force in 
Korea. World War II had brought home to Australians their 
vulnerability, and the ANZUS Treaty (with New Zealand and the 
United States) was negotiated to ensure American defence of Australia 
if necessary against a re-armed Japan. But by the time the treaty was 
signed - in September 1951 - the government saw a more imminent 
threat, from aggressive militaristic communism that appeared a world-
wide phenomenon directed from Moscow aimed at world domination. 
Events in Asia seemed to demonstrate that it was well on the way to 
achieving it. 
The Menzies Liberal-Country parties coalition government, elected in 
late 1949, considered that a third world war, promoted by the USSR, 
was a distinct possibility. Accordingly, in addition to attempting 
(unsuccessfully) to ban the Communist Party, it reintroduced military 
conscription under the euphemistic title of 'National Service'. If this 
was a military move and not just a political one, it did not profit from 
the lessons of the two world wars. Service was only for three months 
full-time , and again it did not include an overseas commitment. Thus 
had more men than the Regular Army field force been required for 
overseas combat, as they were in Korea, they once again would have 
had to be specially enlisted, the Citizen Force training and organization 
being largely wasted. There may have been some benefit, as the 
government claimed was its intention, in developing 'national 
discipline and physical fitness', although some National Servicemen 
would have contested even that. There were numerous grounds for 
exemption from training including those ' whose conscientious beliefs 
do not allow them to engage in any form of naval, military, or air force 
service'. 
During the early 1960s, two situations developed in South-East Asia 
that affected Australia's sense of security. The first was Indonesia's 
'confrontation' of the new state of Malaysia (including the former 
British colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak and, initially, Singapore). 
This was a small but ugly war designed to fracture the new state. The 
second was the growing civil conflict in Vietnam which had been 
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divided by the 1954 Geneva agreements at the 17th parallel of latitude. 
The British government pressed Australia to be involved agamst 
Indonesia, and the Americans sought help to shore up the government 
and forces of South Vietnam. The small Australian Regular Army might 
have been able to manage a contribution to one or other of these, but 
not to both at the same time, and in late 1964 Sir Robert Menz1es 
announced a new National Service scheme to be introduced early in the 
following year. This required 20-year-olds selected by a ballot of 
birthdays to serve full-time for two years, overseas if necessary, wtth a 
subsequent three years in the reserve, part-time Citizen Military Forces. 
Those selected could, alternatively, fulfil a longer period of reserve 
service. 
In view of the history of opposition to conscription, it is surprising 
that there was imtJally so little resistance to the new scheme. The 
birthday ballot was capricious and arbitrary, but not patently unjust. 
But in the country at large there was disqutet about the situations to 
Australia's north, and especially about Indonesia which, since the late 
1950s, had been acquiring arms, including modern fighter and bomber 
aircraft, submarines, and even a naval cruiser, from the Soviet Union. 
It was this national disquiet that made the new National Service 
scheme more acceptable, even when conscripts were sent to Vietnam to 
help the South defend itself, and to demonstrate to the US Australia's 
dependability as an ally. But the nature of that war, as fought by 
largely conscripted American forces, its moral ambiguities, and its 
uncertain relevance to the security of Australia, all came in the late 
1960s to reinforce 'natural' resistance not only to compulsory combat 
service but also to compulsory service overseas. Churches, some 
educationalists, some politicians and other politically active groups 
combined to press the government to withdraw Australian troops from 
Vietnam, and even to urge young men to defy the law. The 
government was not deflected from its course, and only withdrew the 
forces in late 1971 and early 1972 pari passu with the American 
withdrawals. When the Whittam Labor government came to power in 
late 1972, it cancelled the National Service legislation and withdrew the 
handful of Australian advisers left in Vietnam. In the seven years of 
this second National Service scheme, nearly 64,000 men had been 
conscripted, a quarter of whom saw service in Vietnam. Their combat 
efficiency was widely remarked upon. 
As a footnote to Vietnam, in 1983 the Senate referred to the Standing 
Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs the whole question of 
'Conscientious objection to conscripted military service'. The 
Committee recommended (Parliamentary Paper No 233/1985) that 
legislation should add to the present recognition of absolute 
conscientious belief to allow 'exemption from participation in a 
particular military conflict where to be compelled by law to do so 
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would violate the individual's sense of personal mtegrity'. Exemptions 
should be determined in proceedings which so far as possible are 
informal and non-adversarial before a tnbunal of at least three 
members. 
Most of the immigrants to Australia since World War II have come 
from countries with a history of compulsory military servtce. With or 
wtthout such a program, it seems unlikely that sizeable Australian 
forces will be sent overseas in the foreseeable future, and conscription 
for home defence has never been a problem. It thus seems unlikely that 
Australia will again see the massed protests against conscription of the 
period 1966-71. And if there were a cause tn which .Austra lians 
believed, it is suggested that Australia ' s experience will, if belatedly, 
endorse the experience of other countries It seems, further, that many 
conscnpts are in fact willing to serve and can be a vital part of a 
nation's milttary strength. 
World War I veteran on the 50th anniversary of Anzac Day 
